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The Dual Function of Judgment Devices. Why Does 
the Plurality of Market Classifications Matter? 
Eve Chiapello & Gaëtan Godefroy ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Doppelfunktion der Beurteilungsinstrumente. Warum die Plura-
lität der Marktklassifikationen zählt«. This article aims to advance understand-
ing of the dual function of judgment devices (Karpik 2010) in markets. First, 
these devices support the construction of markets and their segmentation into 
classes of products, each segment being associated with different procedures 
for judging the quality or value of goods. Second, they organize classifications 
and a ranking of the things traded in the same market segment. The fragmen-
tation of markets, understood as the cohabitation of several types of judgment 
devices, each one associated with different configurations of actors and prac-
tices, can then be seen as a welcome source of diversity, preventing the stand-
ardizing effects that would result from over-similar judgment devices. This arti-
cle studies the classification operations that accompany changes in the French 
market that provides funding for social-sector organizations through financial 
and banking channels. We observe the arrival on this market of impact invest-
ing, the name given since the end of the 2000s to a set of venture capitalism-
inspired financing methods that originated in the USA and the UK. We study 
these classification operations at three levels: the boundary-building work 
needed to create the idea of a new financing market (the impact investing (II) 
market), the fragmentation of the existing market for financing social organi-
zations into sub-spaces governed by different assessment and classification re-
gimes, and the effect of these classifications on the organizations being judged. 
Keywords: Judgment devices, classification, boundary work, quality conven-
tions, impact investing, social business, social sector, venture capital. 
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1.  Introduction1 
Impact investing (in short: II) is the name that has been given since the end of 
the 2000s to a set of financing methods intended for firms and organizations 
with a social purpose, whether they are for-profit (e.g. firms set up by social 
entrepreneurs) or more traditional non-profit organizations that provide social 
services (e.g. education, health, housing, etc.). These methods mainly consist in 
adapting financial investors’ practices to this sector: developing specific invest-
ment funds, risk assessment metrics and returns, and connecting these funds to 
the financial asset management circuits in the initial fund-raising stage, then 
throughout the duration of the investment. II promises investors a dual return, 
both financial and social (or environmental), on their investments, and presents 
itself as an alternative to public or philanthropic funding of social activities in 
the North and development aid in the South.2 To achieve this, a new type of 
investment fund must be developed: impact funds, principally modeled on 
venture capital funds, since the investees are small, unlisted organizations.  
II practices were invented in the USA and UK. They are actively promoted 
internationally and the popularity of the concept can be traced through a num-
ber of initiatives both transnational (by bodies such as the G8 or the European 
Union) and national (in this article, French), which reflect II’s gradual diffu-
sion. This diffusion is disrupting existing practices concerning the funding of 
social organizations, first by redefining them. While its US and UK promoters 
primarily associate II with venture capital-type financing, its French importers 
are remodeling it to encompass other pre-existing practices while also support-
ing growth for new actors in the social segment. If a market is considered to be 
unified by shared judgment practices, then the French market is fragmented. 
Two different finance providers can be identified, using judgment devices of 
differing natures and origins, and operating through largely disconnected fi-
nancing methods. At least two major types of approach and financing method 
can be observed, forming two sub-segments (or classes) in the market. As a 
result of this fragmentation, social organizations in search of funding can theo-
retically find financing on variable terms as regards expected returns and inves-
tor involvement in their activities. The current fragmentation of this financing 
market allows different practices to coexist, but the competition between mar-
ket segments for the public funding that supports them and the public policies 
that institutionalize them can be a source of concern for social organizations. 
This example will be used to illustrate the dual function of judgment devices 
in markets. Market judgment devices shape not only market segmentation, but 
                                                             
1  We are grateful for the comments received from one anonymous reviewer, Karoline Krenn, 
the editor of the HSR Special Issue and Philipp Golka. 
2  This question can be seen as a form of financialization of the social (see Chiapello 2015). 
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also the ranking of the objects inside each compartment. These two facets of 
judgment devices have rarely been addressed together in the literature and one 
purpose of this article is to draw them together in the same analysis. The first 
part is devoted to the clarification of the main concepts in the theoretical ap-
proaches underpinning our arguments. We also show how the selected case is 
relevant to study this question. In the second part, we present the efforts made 
by mainly US and UK impact investing promoters to create a new market, or as 
they would say a new “asset class” (Morgan 2010). The third part focuses on 
the situation in France.  
2.  Understanding the Role of Judgment Devices in the 
Production of Market Classifications 
Sociological research has attracted attention to the institutions that facilitate 
trade or exchanges and contribute to the social construction of markets (Swed-
berg 1994; Fligstein and Dauter 2007). Some of them are classifications, un-
derstood as organized systems for classifying varied objects. In the case of 
markets, the first thing to be classified is whatever is traded, which is generally 
grouped into classes based on quality, for example wheat grain of a certain 
quality (Cronon 1991, 116). The “quality class” is then associated with specific 
judgment devices that are considered relevant for valuing what is recognized as 
being of the same “quality.” For example, high-quality goods may be valued on 
the basis of the producer’s name, whereas standard goods may be valued on the 
basis of the type of materials used in making them. These judgment devices can 
take various forms (Karpik 2010): they may be founded on measurement sys-
tems and quantified criteria, involve expert assessment, rely on word-of-mouth 
reputation through social networks, etc. 
But ultimately, a judgment is formed on the basis of conventions that the re-
searcher can try to bring to light. We now highlight the dual role of these 
judgment devices in the construction of markets (they stabilize different sub-
spaces of exchanges or market segments) and in the production of classifications 
inside each segment, which have consequences for the objects of classification.  
2.1  The Dual Role of Judgment Devices 
Segmentation of markets into different classes (whether the segmentation re-
sults from formal rules related to market regulation controlling the products 
and participants in market dealings, or from the business dynamics brought out 
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by analysis)3 is a central question in understanding how real markets operate. 
The seminal proposal by Eymard-Duvernay (1989) deserves note. His objective 
was to explain the complexity of the industrial fabric in a given sector, and the 
diversity of existing forms of exchange, which standard economic theory was 
unable to take into account. His concept of quality convention should improve 
our understanding: 
The complexity of the industrial fabric comes from the coexistence of these 
different ways of assessing quality. Some zones of exchange have a more nat-
ural affinity with one particular assessment practice […]. But their distribution 
between different quality conventions is never completely stabilized, and this 
gives rise to continuous risks and tensions. The plurality of quality conven-
tions explains the diversity of forms of coordination that are simultaneously in 
force, with the economic fabric presenting as a tangle of varying kinds of ties. 
A purely market-based standpoint ignores this complexity, and thus weakens 
the analysis considerably. (Eymard-Duvernay 1989, 359, our own translation) 
The French economics of conventions (Eymard-Duvernay 2006a, 2006b) has 
since then produced numerous studies using the quality convention concept to 
differentiate market segments based on the features of the goods exchanged 
(Eymard-Duvernay 1989; Salais and Storper 1997; Eymard-Duvernay and 
Marchal 1996; Rivaud-Danset and Salais 1992). Among other advantages, 
market segments (or quality classes) make it possible to set coherent prices 
within a category, as goods of the same type are valued by the same type of 
procedures and all participants more or less agree on what matters in the valua-
tion process, i.e. on a quality convention. But quality conventions do more than 
just support exchange by facilitating agreement on the thing and the price. As 
Eymard-Duvernay (1989) stresses, they can explain the forms of coordination 
in action between economic actors whose relations cannot be reduced to pure 
market exchanges. Many studies in economic sociology concern market devic-
es (Callon et al. 2007; Callon and Muniesa 2005), principally considered in 
terms of how they facilitate or structure price-setting. We propose in this article 
to analyze them in terms of the way they structure and coordinate actors on 
market segments both upstream and downstream of the market exchange, nota-
bly by harmonizing the rules for judging the quality of what is being ex-
changed, but also what should be produced and what is expected from the 
parties. This makes it possible to trace different configurations of actors and 
game rules, through quality conventions and the judgment devices that enact 
them. As Eymard-Duvernay (1989) emphasizes, these segments or classes are 
not necessarily stable, and it is also the researcher’s job to understand the cross-
connections, tensions, and competition between them, and how they have de-
veloped. This is what we aim to do here for the case of the market providing 
                                                             
3  Identification of market segments associated with different competitors, clients and de-
mand features is one of the basic tasks in any marketing or corporate strategy analysis.  
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funding through financial and banking channels for social sector organizations 
in France; a market that is in upheaval as practices, discourses, quality conven-
tions and forms of coordination associated with the US and UK concept of 
impact investing are being imported into France. 
Judgment devices support the building of markets and their segmentation into 
classes of products, each segment having a special type of judgment procedure 
associated with a specific relational configuration. It is important to stress that it 
is not necessary for every organization operating on a market to use exactly the 
same judgment devices: this situation can arise when a single metric becomes the 
established practice, for example, but is relatively rare. However, organizations in 
the same segment share the same approach to quality assessment and use the 
same type of devices. Within the same market segment, these devices also 
organize classifications and a ranking of the things traded there. This second 
feature is what is most often noted in the sociology of markets (Beckert and 
Musselin 2013), which sees quality classifications as a way of achieving prices 
based on quality judgment in markets where the problem of quality uncertainty 
is crucial4 (as in the market studied by Akerlof [1970]5). It is for example pos-
sible to show that there is a link between the quality judgments available and 
the level of prices (Beckert and Rössel 2013; Rössel and Beckert 2013). 
Figure 1: The Dual Role of Judgement Devices 
Figure 1 schematically represents the dual role of judgment devices, which 
contribute to the production of two types of market classifications. First, they 
contribute to the institutionalization of market classes considered as market 
segments: in Figure 1, type A, B, and C devices are central to the coordination 
                                                             
4  In the same line, Karpik (2010) argues that judgment devices are all the more important 
when products are differentiated and singular. 
5  Akerlof (1970), studying the market for second-hand cars, argued that uncertainty over 
quality leads to destruction of the market. The classification system reduces, so to speak, 
this uncertainty and information asymmetry. 
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of sub-segments of a single, bigger market. The segments overlap because 
some actors (providers or buyers) may be involved in different relational 
configurations, and some goods may be exchanged through different channels. 
Second, inside each segment, type A, B and C devices classify actors and 
products, thus enabling their comparison and ranking.  
The capacity of judgment devices to rank things in the same category should 
also be addressed from a more critical standpoint than simple acknowledge-
ment of their instrumental role in the market’s operation. Ever since Durkheim 
and Mauss (1969 [1903]), sociology has been interested in what classifications 
do to the things, or people they classify. Inclusion in a particular category has 
social consequences that are all the more unpleasant when the category carries 
a stigma. Critical sociology combined with the sociology of knowledge has 
produced countless studies aiming to deconstruct categories and show the re-
sulting social determinisms (Hacking 1999; Bourdieu 1984; Starr 1992; Four-
cade and Healy 2013). It is thus impossible to see the judgment devices that 
structure market sub-segments solely as solutions to coordination problems or 
different organization practices, because the evaluations they produce have 
consequences. Judgment devices are used to value not only products that are 
being exchanged, but also the actors that produce them.6 As we will now ex-
plain, the case of impact investing is particularly suitable to highlight the im-
portance of judgment devices for shaping the future of actors, because it is a 
market for binding promises. 
2.2  The Relevance of the Impact Investing Case  
Impact investing is a market for finance and markets for finance have the par-
ticularity of connecting actors, the organizations that provide finance and the 
organizations financed. Products may circulate, such as financial securities, but 
they are simply the commodification of contracts that bind actors together in 
the long term. This aspect is particularly apparent when looking at the vocabu-
lary: a bond for example can be the name for a financial security or a relation-
ship. This is a far cry from the ideal-type of the market, in which parties are 
once again independent immediately after the exchange is completed. The 
notion of market is usually typically understood in contrast to debt and gifts, 
just as freedom contrasts with the constraint of contractual bonds. But the mar-
kets for finance do not correspond to this definition, since longer-term relations 
are created there. The same applies to labor market as a job is not an item of 
                                                             
6  It would also be relevant to look at the effects on the actors who buy the products, as in 
the case of luxury or “statutory goods,” or cultural goods that are markers of belonging to 
social groups (Bourdieu 1984). 
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merchandise like any other. It is a long-term conditional relationship construct-
ed with an organization.7  
Consequently in both types of markets (finance or labor), the judgment de-
vices in use classify not products, but the desirability of particular relations, 
and this has decisive effects, at least on the party seeking finance (or employ-
ment): will they manage to obtain funding (or a job)? On what terms? In ex-
change for submission to what discipline? The few existing economic sociolo-
gy studies examining how judgment devices affect people and entities (and not 
only products and prices) all have the specificity of concentrating on the type 
of market where bonds and promises are traded, rather than products, and 
where contracts that affect the parties’ future are signed. This is true of the 
studies by Fourcade and Healy (2013) and Lazarus (2012) who look at con-
sumer credits and personal loans, and by Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 
(1996) focusing on labor markets. The study by Espeland and Sauder (2007) on 
the role of university rankings is another example, as university rankings tend 
to structure matching between students and higher education institutions and 
determine universities’ access to certain resources, particularly financial re-
sources. The research by Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal (1996) and Lazarus 
(2012), feeding largely on French conventionalist research, succeed to some 
extent in the dual approach proposed here, combining analysis of different 
market segments (labor or personal loans) with analysis of the judgment devic-
es used to assess the people. They show that the way people are valued and 
treated varies according to the market segment, because the regimes of coordi-
nation and the judgment devices in use vary. In the case of II, we shall see that 
there are at least two segments in this financing market, occupied by different 
financial institutions and using specific valuation methods for the organizations 
seeking financing. These different valuation processes are not without conse-
quences for the selection of the organizations that will be funded, the terms 
granted and the type of relations between them and their finance providers.  
Impact investing is also interesting to study because it is a “concerned mar-
ket” (Geiger et al. 2014) – in the same way as fair trade or the market for 
“green” products. The usual promise to investors of II is indeed that the money 
invested will produce a double return: a financial one for the investors and a 
social one for the public interest. Concerned markets are – by construction – 
shot through with a variety of values that cause tensions between “orders of 
worth” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). These increase the difficulties of agree-
ing on relevant judgment devices, or to borrow the expression of MacKenzie 
(2009), of “making things the same,” i.e. relating the heterogeneity of what is 
being exchanged to a standard that makes things comparable, converting plural 
                                                             
7  This specificity comes on top of the often emphasized specificity that labor – which is what 
the person seeking a job is selling – is also a fictitious commodity, as defined by Polanyi 
(1944), because it cannot be separated from the person. 
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qualities into comparable quantities, i.e. commensuration (Espeland and Ste-
vens 1998). In a market where goods are seen from the outset as having several 
“dimensions” (economic, social, and environmental for example), the dispute 
over the conventions that can be used to judge quality appears even harder to 
resolve. It can concern not only the criteria to select for each dimension, but 
also the weight each one should carry in the overall judgment. Unless a stand-
ard succeeds in accumulating enough coercive force (e.g. via a legal obligation) 
or economic force (e.g. by attracting the market’s most powerful actors) to 
permanently sideline other proposals, the debates are more likely to end in 
fragmentation of the markets, with many actors using a variety of quality 
judgment systems. The study of a fragmented market is certainly a good way to 
compare the different quality conventions in use and their effects on parties. 
Analyzing this fragmentation dynamically could also enhance understanding 
of the link between the market’s structural evolution (each segment’s size and 
game rules) and the consequences of this evolution for the organizations fi-
nanced. The case of II in France is also interesting as to this aspect, because it 
concerns an environment undergoing significant change, marked by the arrival 
of a new conception coming from abroad, which forces the participants to shift 
their practices. 
2.3  Method and Data 
The rest of this article is organized around a presentation of the case of II in 
France, which is used in a dynamic narrative to bring out the dual function of 
judgment devices.  
The difficulty presented by this case is that the category of II is not a local 
category. Not only is it “foreign,” it is also recent and is the object of mainly 
intellectual investments (in the form of reports, surveys, development of meas-
urement systems and standards) designed to institutionalize and create a new 
“asset class,” as its promoters would say (Morgan 2010). The very concept of 
II is in fact a topic of discussions in this inner circle to determine its meaning, 
and this complicates our task since discussions about the concept and its 
boundaries are ultimately part of the object of our study. It is thus important to 
pay attention to the work of building a new category before seeing how French 
actors then take the whole and translate its approach into their national space. It 
is only in a second phase that we will examine all the practices its French im-
porters have placed under the umbrella of II, mainly through studying the 
judgment devices used, to show the existence of several evolving segments. 
Our work is thus based on two major sources. First, we collected discourses 
and information available online concerning the actors and promoters of the II 
market, including think tanks, foundations, financial actors, etc. We have col-
lected and read a great many publications produced by banks (e.g. JP Morgan, 
Credit Suisse), audit and consulting firms (e.g. Monitor, McKinsey & Cy, 
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Boston Consulting group, KPMG), international organizations (e.g. OECD, 
World Bank, G8), universities (e.g. Stanford, Northwestern, Harvard), large 
foundations (e.g. Rockefeller, REDF, Bertelsmann), special network organiza-
tions (e.g. EVPA, Social finance, World economic Forum, Eurosif), but also 
public bodies in different countries. We sought notably to understand the type 
of classification operations these publications perform to build this “new” 
market and the role they give to judgment devices in its construction. It can be 
noted that since this object is relatively new, there is very little sociological 
research on the topic (Barman 2015; Golka 2016). Data collection and analysis 
have taken place progressively through constant monitoring of the subject since 
2012 and regular discussions with people involved in this professional field.8 
Among this gray literature, texts produced by the French promoters of the 
category required special attention. We shall return in part 4 to the report by the 
Comité Français (2014), written by a French working party at the request of 
government Minister Benoît Hamon as part of an international initiative by the 
G8. We have also attended various conferences and events organized in France 
on the topic since 2013. 
The second source of information comes from a small field study conducted 
in 2014 with financial actors operating on the impact investing market in 
France (see appendix). Twenty-one interviews (of which fourteen were recorded 
and transcribed) and a three-day observation period in the investment team of 
one of the French funds provided a grasp of the judgment devices actually used 
by French actors,9 and the way they position themselves in relation to each 
other and compared their judgment methods. Our survey covered the same type 
of actors as those brought together for the Comité Français (2014) report.10 
They answered our questions on practices for assessing the social impact of the 
organizations financed and showed us their measurement instruments and 
reporting documents. The interviewees were chosen with the objective of a 
widely diverse sample. As there are not many financial actors in France con-
cerned by these practices, this data collection is enough to give good insights 
into the structuring of the French field. The data has also been cross-checked 
with gray literature and other research on the French social investment sector 
(Chateau-Terrisse 2013; Bourgeron 2016). The field study highlights the exist-
ence of two evaluation approaches associated with different actors. It so hap-
pens that the two groups identified on the basis of other criteria by the Comité 
Français report (2014), presented in a well-documented appendix to that re-
                                                             
8  The first author (as supervisor of a Master’s thesis) has for example been involved in the 
research conducted by Adrien Baudet (Alix and Baudet 2013) in a French think tank dedi-
cated to European affairs.  
9  This field work was conducted by the second author as part of a Master’s thesis. 
10  We interviewed seven funds. Five had representatives on the report committee (the fund of 
funds A and the regional fund G were not involved in the committee). See appendix. 
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port, were consistent with the two smaller groups in our sample. The market 
segments identified through our survey focusing on judgment devices are thus 
also acknowledged by professionals, who associate them with other questions 
(such as the legal status of the organizations funded, or the hoped-for financial 
return). Our presentation of the French market will thus be based both on the 
survey and the data collected by the authors of the French report; this infor-
mation was also complemented with further information taken from their web-
sites about the actors on the French impact investing market, particularly our 
interviewees, and a more specific examination of the legal framework. 
Despite the relatively small scale of the interview-based survey, this article 
thus draws on an extensive body of information to propose a sound overview of 
an issue on which practically no sociological research has yet been published. It 
remains a broadly exploratory work, intended to give intelligibility to an ongoing 
transformation of discourses and practices in the financing of social organizations 
in France. We use this work to illustrate the complexity of the role played by 
judgment devices in the production of various types of market classifications. 
In the following part (3), we present the efforts made by impact investing 
promoters to create first the idea of II, and then the market itself. We shall see 
that this requires an initial work of categorization intended to separate impact 
investing from other related practices. This is broadly a work of boundary-
building, associated with the construction of a quality judgment system able to 
organize this new space.   
3.  The “Building of a Marketplace” and a New “Industry”11 
The creation of II market has been the subject of continuous effort since at least 
2007, led in the United States by the Rockefeller Foundation12 (Barman 2015) 
and in the UK, under the name of “Social investment” by various groups and 
institutions encouraged by Sir Ronald Cohen (co-founder of the first venture 
                                                             
11  In the words of the promoters of II (Rockefeller 2012a and 2012b; Monitor 2009). 
12  In 2008, the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation approved $38 million in sup-
port of the Impact Investing Initiative for the period 2008-11. In particular, “the Founda-
tion’s support aims to achieve four major outcomes: 1) Catalyze collective action platforms 
that help impact investors work together more effectively on activities such as standard 
setting, advocacy and marketing; 2) Develop industry “infrastructure,” such as standards and 
rating systems; 3) Support scaling of intermediaries ranging from private equity funds to 
secondary market facilities; and 4) Contribute to fundamental research and advocacy neces-
sary to grow the field of impact investing” (Jackson 2012 b). The foundation funded several 
reports (Monitor 2009; JP Morgan 2010) that were then aggressively marketed. The report 
by Monitor (2009), in particular, based on a study of “mainstream” financial practices, iden-
tifies a whole series of necessary actions to “build a marketplace” and “to unlock capital” 
which became a roadmap for the foundation during the four years of the initiative. 
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capital fund set up in Europe in 1972).13 These actions have recently taken on 
an international dimension. The United Kingdom put II on the G8 agenda dur-
ing its presidency in 2013 (SIITF 2014a) and in 2014 each of the G8 countries, 
including France, produced a national report explaining its position on the issue 
and determined various action to be taken to promote it. The European Union is 
part of the movement, and in October 2011 launched a “Social Business Initia-
tive,” through which the Commission set out an action plan to strengthen the 
role of social businesses in the Single Market, as announced in the Single Mar-
ket Act of April 2011. Various actions have been taken under this framework,14 
including the establishment of a fund of funds named The Social Impact Accel-
erator (SIA)15 in 2015 managed by the European Investment Fund, which in-
vests the money collected in II funds located in various European countries. 
Various actors including think tanks, foundations, financial actors, etc., are 
therefore striving to create a new market segment for corporate finance, and 
their proposals are being taken up and incorporated into public systems both at 
national and supranational levels. One of their objectives is to give credibility 
to the existence of a new “asset class” as this concept structures the work of 
finance professionals. To identify this class, a “convention of equivalence” 
(Desrosières 2001) is needed that makes it possible to include otherwise dis-
parate elements. This convention must be capable of judging whether goods are 
of the required quality (in our context, whether they are indeed “impact invest-
ments”) while leaving aside goods of similar quality that are not part of the class. 
This work has a strong boundary-building dimension, as it must be possible to 
draw a line between what will and will not be included in the new class. It also 
involves diverse efforts to establish specific judgment devices suitable for 
evaluation of the specific goods traded there. The two facets of this work are 
discussed below. This is close to a work of ideological production, combining 
normative proposals with practical and methodological proposals. It is im-
                                                             
13  Creation in 2000 of the Social investment task force or SIFT (at the request of HM Treasury); 
then in 2007 the not-for profit organization Social Finance UK which lay behind the first 
experiment with Social Impact Bonds in 2009 at Peterborough prison; establishment of Big 
Society Capital in 2010; the G8’s Social Impact Investment Task force (SIITF) created in 2013 
was chaired by Sir Ronald Cohen, who was also the first Chairman of Bridges Venture, a 
venture capital fund dedicated to social investments launched in 2002 (see <http://www. 
ronaldcohen.org> (Accessed February 21, 2017). 
14  <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy/enterprises/index_en.htm> (Accessed March 
22, 2017). 
15  “The Social Impact Accelerator (SIA) is the first pan-European public-private partnership 
addressing the growing need for availability of equity finance to support social enterprises. 
[…] [It] reached its final closing in July 2015 at the size of EUR 243m, combining resources 
from the EIB Group and external investors, including Credit Coopératif, Deutsche Bank as 
well as the Finnish group SITRA and the Bulgarian Bank of Development (BDB).” 
<http://www.eif.org/what_we_do/equity/sia/index.htm> (Accessed February 21, 2017). 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  163 
portant to distinguish it from the actual implementation of these proposals, and 
the possible extension and forms of the practices that claim to be part of them.16  
3.1  Boundary Building 
As Höchstädter and Scheck (2015) point out, the impact investing concept 
remains vague despite its popularity. Yet there has been a constant effort to 
establish a definition ever since the earliest reports funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation. The Monitor report (the first one the Rockefeller Foundation com-
missioned) tried for example to position II in relation to “social investing,”17 
“philanthropy,”18 “mission-related investment,” “project-related investment,” 
“bottom of the pyramid,” “private sector in poor countries,” “corporate social 
responsibility,” “inclusive business” (Monitor 2009, 14). As the idea gradually 
takes shape the definitions are becoming more stable. 
The European Venture Philanthropy Association proposes a fairly compre-
hensive and frequently-used classification (cf. Figure 2), based on the type of 
organization financed (charities, social enterprises, socially driven businesses, 
traditional businesses) but associating each one with a form of financial contri-
bution (grant making, social investment, investment) and an investor approach 
(impact only, impact first, finance first).  
In the middle of this spectrum is “social investment”, which is different 
from both grant making and investment in CSR19 companies (which are the 
typical target of Socially Responsible Investment [SRI]). This dual exclusion of 
pure philanthropy and SRI is used in the majority of reports and publications 
we consulted to define the boundaries of the II class by exclusion. They define 
SRI as financing for-profit companies (mainly listed) that are selected accord-
                                                             
16  II remains an ultra-minority practice for the time being. Eurosif, the network for all socially 
responsible investment (SRI) actors in Europe, conducts surveys every two years about the 
management strategies used by SRI asset managers in thirteen European countries. The 
types of strategy identified are “exclusion,” “norms-based screening,” “best-in-class selec-
tion,” “sustainability themes,” “ESG integration,” and “engagement and voting”. In 2011, the 
“impact investing” strategy was added. In 2013, the survey estimated that II assets under 
management accounted for around 1% of total SRI assets declared (Eurosif 2014, table p. 
34). SRI management is itself a minority practice in the asset management industry. 
17  “Social investing includes investments made with the intention of having a positive impact, 
investments that exclude ‘harmful’ activities, and investments that are driven by investors’ 
values and don’t necessarily correspond to having a positive social or environmental impact. 
Impact investing is a subset of social investing; it refers only to the social investing that 
actively seeks to have a positive impact” (Monitor 2009, 14). Social investing in this first 
definition includes II and Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). 
18  “Philanthropy has traditionally focused on gifts made by individuals and organizations to 
benefit society and the environment. Impact investing, with its requirement of a minimum 
return of principal, is distinct from grantmaking activities. Impact investing can however 
be an important vehicle for philanthropists to realize their objectives” (Monitor 2009, 14). 
19  Corporate Social Responsibility. 
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ing to different strategies along Environmental, Social and Governance criteria 
(ESG), whereas II is a type of financing for “social businesses” or organiza-
tions “designed with intent to make a positive impact” (Morgan 2010, 7) such 
as “helping” unemployed people back into work, preventing convicts from 
reoffending, providing micro-credit, etc. The organizations financed by II are 
usually small and unlisted, and some have adopted a legal form of entity that 
prevents them from distributing profit.  
Figure 2: Investment Spectrum  
 
Source: EVPA, <http://evpa.eu.com/about-us/what-is-venture-philanthropy> (Accessed Febru-
ary 22, 2017). 
 
Yet this boundary building work is also an opportunity for boundary blurring. 
This representation stresses the existence of one continuum from gifts to in-
vestments (under the name of “venture philanthropy”) (Chiapello 2015), and 
another continuum structured around the idea of “social purpose organizations,” 
some of which distribute profits while others do not. The aim is to assert that 
there is no difference between gifts and investments apart from the type of 
return the investor is seeking.  
This boundary building work also has to be securely attached to the concept 
of the asset class. This is attempted in the report by the merchant bank JP Mor-
gan (2010), also commissioned by the Rockefeller foundation,20 which decided 
to use “indicators of an asset class”21 (ibid., 24). Indications are then gathered 
                                                             
20  “Impact investments have begun to carve out a niche within the investment portfolios of a 
wide range of investor types, but does that make them an asset class? We believe it does based 
on an understanding of how the term ‘asset class’ has come to be used” (JP Morgan 2010, 24). 
21  The indicators are the following 1) “Unique set of investment/risk management skills” 
(Professionals defining themselves by their expertise in the sector); 2) “Organizational struc-
tures to accommodate this skillset” (Sell-side experts in the sector; Buy-side organizations 
allocating capital and hiring investment specialists in the sector); 3) “Industry organizations, 
associations and education” (Networks, conferences, education and resources are built to 
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to demonstrate that Impact investments are “showing signs of being a burgeon-
ing asset class.” The report also takes the opportunity to identify all the ele-
ments needed for a separate market to work, and states clearly what should be 
done. Among these operations, one is of particular interest to us: establishing 
devices for assessing qualities that could organize the space defined, in other 
words, a system of “standardized metrics, benchmarks, and/or ratings.” Once 
the market, or the universe of investments that can be considered as “impact 
investments,” has been delimited, the space must be organized based on judg-
ment devices that can coordinate the parties. In particular, criteria are needed 
on which to base prices. In the world of finance, the convention is that the 
prices of financial assets relate to the expected return and the anticipated risk. 
This is what we have called the mean-variance convention (Chiapello and 
Walter 2016). But in this case, this convention is insufficient because impact 
assets not only have to produce a financial return, they must also generate 
social returns, and that requires elaboration of appropriate judgment devices.  
3.2  Building Judgment Devices to Classify Assets  
For the II marketplace builders, this question of social impact assessment was 
immediately seen as decisive. Since the intermediaries (fund managers) are 
engaged by investors to invest their money with the expectation of a dual – 
social and financial – return, the question of their accountability is central. The 
impact has become a promise to an investor just like the promise of financial 
returns, and so reporting must concern both issues. Measuring the impact thus 
potentially structures the entire investment chain, the relations between inves-
tees (the social organizations financed) and the financial intermediary (the 
impact fund), and the relations between the fund and its investors, which may 
also be intermediaries themselves (funds of funds). 
Investors also want to be able to compare and choose their investments in 
different social organizations or impact funds. Standard metrics that are good 
for comparability have obvious virtues, as does the possibility of employing 
third parties to conduct audits, evaluations or ratings. For example, the Rocke-
feller Foundation instigated and funded the creation of the GIIN (Global Im-
pact Investing Network),22 whose first initiative was to produce a catalogue of 
400 impact indicators called the IRIS (Impact Reporting and Investment Stand-
ard). Next, it helped the non-profit organization B-Lab to develop ratings for 
                                                                                                                                
address the new group of experts in the field); 4) “Standardized metrics, benchmarks, and/or 
ratings” (Risk and return reporting standardization; Indices to monitor and benchmark the 
performance of the sector; Ratings to help investors find relative value between investment 
prospects) (JP Morgan 2010, 25). 
22  <www.thegiin.org> (Accessed February 22, 2017).  
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social firms (with the GIIRS [Global Impact Investing Rating System]) (Bar-
man 2015). The G8 Social Impact Investment Task Force (SIITF 2014b) also 
issued a special report on the subject, while the EU commissioned a report 
from the Expert Group on Social Entrepreneurship (GECES 2014), and there 
are countless publications on the same issue by banks, consulting firms and 
think tanks in a wide range of countries. 
Despite these considerable efforts, the general impression is of extreme dis-
persion in evaluation practices, and this is considered one of the barriers to the 
growth of impact investing.23 Promoters of the market emphasize “a blend of 
the culture and tools of finance and investment, on the one hand, interacting 
with the culture and tools of social-mission organizations, on the other hand” 
(Rockefeller 2012b, 8). Also, many social organizations are still utilizing their 
own methods and indicators, so “fragmentation in measurement approaches 
persists, and tension remains between centralized and decentralized systems” 
(ibid., 13). Finally, there are tensions between “those actors in the field who are 
building measurement systems as public goods, on the one hand, with those 
who carry out impact assessment for proprietary revenue for their organiza-
tions, on the other hand” (Rockefeller 2012a, XVI). This proliferation of possi-
ble metrics and actors with divergent interests prevents collection of substantial 
databases, which financial professionals usually consider necessary for the 
market to develop.24 As a result of the mean-variance convention that domi-
nates in the financial sector, the actors want to found their decisions on quanti-
fied, historical past data that can be used to analyze entire investment portfolios 
according to a small number of metrics (Chiapello and Walter 2016).  
Studying the French setting will provide another understanding of this frag-
mentation. In the dominant narrative, this fragmentation relates to insufficient 
                                                             
23  Eight barriers have been identified : 1) “Shortage of high quality investment opportunities 
with track record,” 2) “Lack of appropriate capital across the risk/return spectrum,” 3) “Diffi-
culty exiting investments,” 4) “Lack of innovative deal/fund structures to accommodate inves-
tors’ or portfolio companies’ needs,“ 5) “Lack of common way to talk about impact investing,“ 
6) “Lack of research and data on products and performance,“ 7) “Lack of investment profes-
sionals with relevant skill sets,“ 8) “Inadequate impact measurement practice“ (GIIN, Morgan 
2014, 6). Interestingly, points 5) 6) 7) and 8) all relate to the development of a common defi-
nition of the market and capacities for assessing these investments, i.e. the two operations 
of boundary building and construction of a judgment system which we are examining. 
24  “The field of impact investing can be rightly said to be metrics-rich […]. However, because 
of its early stage of development, impact investing, so far, is generally data-poor – though 
there are important efforts underway to rectify this situation” (Rockefeller 2012b, 8). The 
IRIS encourages organizations that use its indicators to file their reports in its database. In 
2014, 4,989 organizations reported their performance. The majority of them (64%) operate 
in the financial services sector (mainly microfinance institutions, and impact funds). 24% 
are based each in North America, and Latin America & the Caribbean, with just under 11% 
in Europe and Central Asia (IRIS 2014). Most of the organizations participating in this cen-
tral data collection are financial intermediaries looking for funds, and information about 
their investees remains scarce. 
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maturity in the sector. But this article will show that it is actually caused by the 
existence of different institutions and networks of actors that are coordinated 
differently depending on the judgment devices adopted.  
4.  Impact Investing in France: The Fragmentation of a 
Market around Different Evaluation Cultures 
4.1  The Arrival of Impact Investing in France 
The concept of Impact Investing began to spread in France from 2012, largely 
under the impetus of EU and G8 initiatives.25 It joined a dynamic financial 
world dedicated to social finance that had grown under the name of Finance 
Solidaire (Solidarity Finance) since 1996, around an association called Finan-
sol.26 This association organizes the market, issuing labels and lobbying the 
authorities for favorable changes in the law and taxation (Château-Terrisse 
2013). It also organizes an awareness-raising week every year with a range of 
events and awards, to promote solidarity savings to the general public.27  
In France, private funding for social purposes (apart from gifts and subsi-
dies) has so far grown mainly through attracting investment from private indi-
viduals (i.e. non-professionals) either directly by solidarity organizations, or 
through the intermediary of collective investment products such as employee 
savings plans offered by employers. The vision conveyed by II is different 
from this traditional solidarity finance approach, since the finance practice at 
the heart of the concept is the Venture Capital Fund oriented towards producing 
an impact. These entities raise funds mainly from very wealthy (said “high net 
worth”) individuals or professionals – institutional investors who are them-
selves fund managers – who can provide substantially higher amounts than the 
individuals involved in standard solidarity finance.28 There are a few entities of 
                                                             
25  The first public report on the question was released in 2013 (Guézennec and Malochet 
2013). In April 2012, the Impact2 event was held for the first time in Paris: the aim of the 
first event was “to present and discuss the theme of impact investing, this new segment of 
finance that serves the fight against exclusion and poverty.” The guests included Penelope 
Douglas, founder of Pacific Community Ventures (USA) and Peter L. Scher, Executive VP of 
JP Morgan Chase & Co, and twenty social entrepreneurs from all five continents. This annual 
event has grown constantly since then. In 2015 it began to give out awards to entrepre-
neurs, in cooperation with its sponsors. 
26  <http://www.finansol.org/> (Accessed February 22, 2017). 
27  According to Finansol (2016, 6), solidarity savings accounted for 0.19% of total French 
savings at December 31, 2015, so it is a very small sector. Solidarity savings products in-
tended for socially-oriented organisations are clearly differentiated from SRI in these statistics. 
28  What is largely glossed over in this classical presentation is that development of these 
venture-capital structures requires very active public policies: raising impact funds is greatly 
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this kind in France that predate the importation of the II concept, but they only 
attracted a comparatively small amount of funds. And so the II concept in 
France appears to be attractive above all for those who want to develop this 
new type of financial intermediation.  
Nonetheless, the French report to the G8 included solidarity finance in the 
impact investing category (Comité Français 2014) as the funds collected from 
private individuals via solidarity finance channels must also be invested in 
socially-oriented organizations. If we focus on the use of the funds, in social 
organizations, the common features are undeniable; but if we concentrate on 
the organization of the finance circuits, two groups emerge which the report 
was obliged to distinguish, namely investisseurs solidaires (solidarity inves-
tors) and capitaux-investisseurs à impacts (venture-capital impact investors).29 
The former manage assets worth some €3.7 billion, of which around 
€300 million are invested in “social impact organizations,” while the latter 
reportedly manage assets worth €180 million, all of which are for investment in 
“social impact organizations.” Fund raising in process at the time of writing led 
to hopes that the second segment would double in size in the medium term 
(Comité français 2014, 76-8). 
This report (Comité Français 2014) deserves a closer look, because it ex-
plains the work the importers of II have done in France to adjust it to the 
French context. The French committee in charge of the report was headed by 
Hugues Sibille, Vice-President of the bank Crédit Coopératif since January 
2010. Hugues Sibille is also well known in the French ecosystem devoted to 
developing social entrepreneurship in France, a cause he works tirelessly to 
promote.30 The concept of “social entrepreneurship,” born in the 1990s in the 
United States, is based on the premise that what social activities are lacking to 
achieve real efficiency is genuine entrepreneurs who will manage their activi-
                                                                                                                                
dependent on contributions from public banks or consortiums coordinated by a public initi-
ative. This is the case in Europe with the large contributions from the SIA, in France with the 
Banque Publique d’Investissement, in the UK with Big Society Capital, etc.  
29  Cf. Dossier 2 (supply and demand for social impact corporate finance) attached to the 
report (Comité Français 2014, 70-83). 
30  Hugues Sibille is a former consultant who joined France’s Ministry of Employment under 
Martine Aubry in Lionel Jospin’s left-wing government. He was the Delegate for the Social 
Economy from 1998 to 2001, then joined the public bank CDC where he took part in the 
structuring of support networks for business creation. He founded the AVISE (Agence de 
Valorisation des Initiatives Socio-Economiques) in 2002, with the support of the CDC, to 
assist owners of social projects and in 2005 he moved to the Crédit Coopératif where from 
2008 he was president of the investment subsidiary operating in the social economy. In 
2009 he contributed to the White Paper on social entrepreneurship which proposed to set 
up a merchant bank for social entrepreneurship. In early 2012 he was appointed expert ad-
visor to the European Commission, as part of the Commission’s social business expert group 
(GECES), and participates in this group’s research on measuring social impacts. In June 2013, 
the Minister Benoît Hamon appointed him as the G8 Task Force’s French representative for 
investments with social impacts. 
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ties with the same verve and the same methods as entrepreneurs in the for-
profit world. This idea then spread throughout the world, relayed by business 
schools in the 2000s. Through the various posts he has held, Sibille has always 
aimed to “modernize” the social sector and encourage its development by at-
taching importance to entrepreneurship, and to the construction of financing 
solutions for entrepreneurial organizations. Positioning himself in the long-
established institutions of the social economy which have given him access to 
increasingly central posts, he is also considered as an activist-innovator be-
cause of his constant heart-and-soul support for business solutions for this 
social sector (Sibille 2011). The committee he set up to write the report on II 
has twenty-nine members, all like him committed to this financial “moderniza-
tion”: employees of the Crédit Coopératif, the CDC31 and their subsidiaries, the 
French public investment bank BPI and the French development bank AFD, 
venture capital funds and asset management companies, militant associations in 
the world of social entrepreneurship (AVISE, MOUVES), FINANSOL, repre-
sentatives of major foundations, of venture philanthropy (EVPA), and finally 
two representatives of the French state (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and for 
the Economy) and one representative of the OECD. It is striking that apart from 
one representative of the “social entrepreneurs movement” (MOUVES), there 
are no entities representing the organizations that might be beneficiaries of the 
capital, nor of any of the social sector’s federations. This committee is largely 
favorable to the cause of impact investing, comprising the major French funds 
and banks concerned. The solidarity financing network is represented, but 
essentially through fund managers and the promotion association Finansol. The 
main effort was to federate these financial actors and present the full range of 
what is happening in France under the umbrella label of II. 
Our own survey shows that despite these efforts for greater federation, the 
practices of solidarity investors are not the same as the practices of venture-
capital impact investors: among other things, they use different types of judg-
ment devices and rely on different quality conventions organizing the relation-
ships between investors and investees (notably different return demands), and 
this is not without consequences for the firms assessed. The “solidarity inves-
tors” invest in organizations that carry a label for their social impact, whereas 
the “venture-capital impact investors” refer to ad-hoc indicators relating to the 
activity of the investee. We shall also show that for both segments of the mar-
ket, the idea of constructing a new market for impact investment organized on 
the basis of social impact assessment leads to a greater demand for measure-
ment, although in different forms. The two segments appear to be undergoing 
reorganizations that enable them to specialize professional actors in this type of 
                                                             
31  CDC (Caisse des Dépots et des Consignations) is a French public bank, Crédit Coopératif is a 
cooperative bank which initially mainly worked with associations, cooperatives and small busi-
nesses. Both have developed specific banking products (loans and guarantees) for the sector. 
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investment. The importation of the concept of impact investing thus transforms 
the sector, but without actually eliminating the range of different practices. 
Beyond their differences, both segments have also the common feature of 
drawing on assessment methods that do not seek to establish an equivalence 
(and therefore construct possibilities of trade-offs) between financial returns 
and social returns. But we shall also see how certain actors are nonetheless 
interested in the creation of this type of commensuration and seek to develop 
new types of judgment devices relying on certain tools such as SROI32 (Social 
Return on Investment) or contracts as Social Impact Bonds33 (SIB), even 
though these initiatives have not so far succeeded in building a real third mar-
ket segment in France. 
Table 1 briefly presents the three segments that will now be studied in detail. 
Table 1: Segments of French Impact Investing Markets 
Segments Solidarity Finance 
(the largest segment) 
Social Venture capital 
(smaller but growing fast) 
Social Impact bonds 
(experimental) 
Judgment devices 
used to evaluate 
the social impact 
A Label Ad-hoc non-financial indicators 
Monetary measure 
of social impact 
4.2  Solidarity Investors and the Role of Labelling 
Who are Solidarity Investors? 
Solidarity investing is represented here by managers of “90/10” investment 
funds, which are a French specificity. This type of funds was created by the 
“Fabius” law of 2001 concerning French employee and pension savings. Between 
5% and 10% of the money collected must be invested in approved solidarity 
firms, and the remaining amounts are invested in listed companies but must be 
managed under SRI criteria. Since the 2008 Law on Modernisation of the 
Economy (LME) was adopted, all entities receiving savings investments (sub-
sidiaries of banks and insurance companies) are obliged to include at least one 
solidarity fund in their product range. The law has also organized a number of 
incentives to encourage development of employee savings funds and pension 
funds, notably by reducing taxes on the income generated by the return on 
investment (“Fabius” law of 2001; “Fillon” law of 2003). The law of 2008, 
which more specifically promotes solidarity savings, achieved a substantial 
increase in the amounts invested in social enterprises. Interviewees from organ-
                                                             
32  SROI, a method proposing to give every social impact a monetary value, is actually promoted 
by the same business school (ESSEC) that introduced social entrepreneurship into France. 
33  Proposition # 3 in the French report (Comité Français 2014) to the G8 was in fact to exper-
iment with SIB in France.  
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izations E and F in our sample are in charge of such “90/10” funds, which are 
among the largest on the market. 
The Judgment Devices They Use 
Practices in these cases are strictly governed by the law, which defines the 
criteria and modalities for approving the social firms. They were recently re-
viewed for the new law on Social and Solidarity Economy of 2014. This ap-
proval (called ESUS, standing for entreprises solidaires d’utilité sociale or 
solidarity firms of social utility) is intended “to identify firms with strong social 
value which meet specific social needs and direct support and funding mecha-
nisms, including solidarity savings funds, towards those entities.”34 A firm may 
apply for ESUS approval when it fulfils a number of conditions: 1) its primary 
purpose must be to seek some social benefit, 2) the cost induced by this pur-
pose must have a significant impact on the firm’s income statement or financial 
profitability, 3) wages and differences in wage levels in the firm must comply 
with certain restrictions, 4) the firm’s shares must not be listed on a financial 
market. The ESUS label is automatically awarded to several types of entities 
that already bear a label because they benefit from subsidies, grants or tax 
breaks for their activities (organizations helping people back into work,35 sup-
porting work for disabled people, foundations and associations of recognized 
public benefit, etc.). Other entities can apply for approval once they have existed 
for at least three years. 
ESUS approval results in the definition of a class of organizations that can 
benefit from the solidarity pockets of 90/10 funds, but it does not require any 
further measurement of organizational activities. The label is considered 
enough to guarantee a social impact, while the rest of the decision is based on 
financial criteria. 
So we select them via their impact… um, their utility […] So basically, from 
our point of view, the firm has to have the solidarity approval. […] That’s an 
obligation. It’s given by the Prefecture [the public body issuing ESUS approv-
al]. […] So in our social analysis of the entity, we need to see that support. 
[…] Anyway, we do this analysis of the social utility, then a more traditional 
financial analysis when we look at the accounts, we try to get a business plan. 
[…] We look closely at the social side of things. But if it’s got solidarity ap-
proval, we consider the entity already meets [the criteria]. (E Fund) 
The financial returns in this segment are low for the investor (between 0.5% 
and 2%) (Comité Français 2014), as the ESUS label places (notably rules 2 and 
                                                             
34  <http://www.avise.org/actualites/nouveau-decret-agrement-entreprises-solidaires-dutilite-
sociale> (Accessed February 22, 2017).  
35  Known in France as organizations for “integration through economic activity”: entities to 
help the unemployed find work again that were first developed in the 1990s as part of na-
tional policies to reduce unemployment. 
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3, see above) strong limits on the potential profits. Funds operating on the 
highly competitive employee savings funds market also charge “low” man-
agement fees according to the investors (around 0.5% of the amounts managed) 
which means they cannot dedicate many resources to impact assessment 
(Comité Français 2014, 76).  
The Recent Evolution towards More Measures and Professional 
Specialization 
Fairly simple indicators concerning the activities of the entities financed (num-
ber of homes managed, number of families benefiting from micro-credit, num-
ber of hours of training, etc.) have recently begun to be collected, and are used 
to prepare fund reports. But not even the managers believe that these figures 
measure the impact of investments. 
But then, yes, we now ask for an impact indicator every year all the same […] 
I mean an indicator of the impact of the entity, not our funding! […] well, we 
total up all the social utility entities we finance […] [opens a report and shows 
a page] and in consolidated figures at 31/12/2013 they were managing 6,277 
homes! (E Fund) 
This market segment nonetheless seems to be becoming more organized. A 
gradual grouping of solidarity pockets can be observed in specialist funds, 
which manage solidarity pockets on behalf of several 90/10 funds. Being larger, 
they are able to dedicate people and create specialized investment committees. 
To begin with, the 10% were managed directly by us [the team in charge of 
the total 90/10 fund]. I said: we can’t go on like this, we’re going to set up a 
specialist fund [...] to manage that pocket. We set that fund up in 2005, so it 
took… well, 3 years for it to come out… […] I went to see the management 
and I told them: I can’t keep on managing pockets directly like this. I don’t 
want to manage things like this anymore, I want a specialist fund, with an in-
vestment committee […] something really specific […] It took B** [a compet-
itor] 10 years before it launched its fund compared to us, and A** [another com-
petitor] didn’t believe in it either at the time. (F Fund, the first dedicated fund) 
X** [a bank collecting savings] engaged us a year and a half ago now to man-
age the 10% pocket of its solidarity funds. (E Fund) 
The problem these forms of solidarity pocket groupings into specialist funds 
are trying to resolve was generally solved differently in the past. On the whole, 
most of the 10% pockets used to go to three specialized intermediary entities 
which act not like funds but like firms collecting equity for development: SIFA, 
which initially specialized in funding for entities supporting social integration, 
ADIE which distributes micro-credit in France, and Habitat et Humanisme, 
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which finances construction and management of social housing.36 Specialist 
funds will enable 90/10 fund managers to diversify their investments by having 
their money invested in entities other than these three. This situation also trig-
gers a process of professional specialization among asset managers: some pro-
fessionals are specializing in impact investment, which in our view is a notable 
development. 
Effect on the Investees 
This class of II is characterized by a long chain of intermediation between the 
investor and the investee (involving the collector of the savings, the manager of 
the 90/10 fund, the specialist investors of the social sector) and is strongly 
structured by a label controlled by the State, which is itself inseparable from 
various public policies intended for social purposes. For these reasons, the 
financial actors’ capacity for intervention in the activities of the investees is 
low. Social performance is not a significant management concern for the finan-
ciers, and entities are not compared with each other on that factor. If they are 
considered able to reimburse, then they can have funding for a small cost. 
Small-scale impact funds like the regional fund G in our sample, which are not 
constrained by the legal framework and are in shorter intermediation chains, 
have also chosen to develop their activity, essentially based on the recognition 
of such labels. 
4.3  Venture Capital Impact Investors and the Management by 
Objectives 
Who Are They? 
The actors concerned in this section are investment funds that operate under the 
same legal status as traditional venture capitalists, such as B, C and D Funds in 
our sample. These funds originally raised money from wealthy individuals and 
are now taking advantage of the opening of funds of funds, such as A Fund 
interviewed for this study, the EU’s Social Impact Accelerator (SIA) managed 
by the European Investment Fund (EIF), and special funds for small and medi-
um-sized businesses set up by France’s Public Investment Bank (BPI). These 
funds of funds are more recent contributors to impact funds, but contribute 
large sums. They also add length to the intermediation chain. 
B is a fund that was created in 2007-2008 […], originally founded by the 
owners of investment funds and the top managers of French firms who got to-
gether, around eighty of them, to create a social impact fund. This wasn’t long 
                                                             
36  “These three issuers were historically the first on the market and they’re the ones that 
received a large share of the investments from solidarity funds. But in the last few years 
everyone has been trying to diversify.” (E Fund) 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  174 
after the 2005 riots. The idea was to do something for underprivileged areas. 
And what they knew about was investment funds, investing in businesses. So 
they had the idea of setting up a fund which was for 5 million euros at first. 
[…] In the first fund, there were only individuals. […] Then later, they were 
joined by institutional investors in 2010. They put in 10 million euros. […] 
They are from the banking sector, mutual health insurance companies, people 
with money to manage. And this year we’re going to raise a third fund, of 44 
million Euros. (B Fund) 
Unlike 90/10 funds, which accept low returns on the small share of the portfolio 
intended for social enterprises, these funds mentioned their need to provide 
financial returns. 
And there’s a social (called “fiduciary”) responsibility: we manage assets, for 
insurance clients too, so we have to have a return on investment; there’s a 
purpose, namely paying a return on a euro fund for Mr Dupond in France, 
who well, who’s going to invest his savings. (A Fund) 
According to the Comité Français (2014, 78), the expected returns vary from 
3% to 12% and the management fees withheld are 1% to 3% of assets under 
management, in other words two to six times higher than for solidarity finance 
providers, whose job is very different in the opinion of our interviewees. 
We don’t do solidarity […] that’s a very specific, very French status. What we 
want to do is quite the opposite. Solidarity investing is philanthropy! Funds 
that finance entities that aren’t trying to make money. The Prefecture approval 
is completely… Well, capping the manager’s salary so he can’t earn more 
than x times the minimum wage. What’s that got to do with anything?... What 
I’m interested in is knowing if the impact is monitored at all […]. But after all 
when you’re lending money with no hope of getting it back… With solidarity 
funds, you don’t get a return. You’re giving up on returns. You get the capital 
repaid, but there’s no return. So obviously if that’s used for the association’s 
boss to buy himself a BMW because he’s getting money, well clearly… You 
have to make sure there’s some level of governance […]. Solidarity funds are 
a very French thing. They’re a great thing too… I’m in the board of a firm that 
funds solidarity projects and there are wonderful stories, but those stories 
aren’t tenable. Solidarity investing often concerns associations […]. Impact 
Investing isn’t the same thing, it’s quite different. (A Fund) 
The Judgment Device They Use 
The judgment devices adopted by impact venture capitalists to identify targets 
also differ, as reference to a label certifying social quality appears to be insuffi-
cient. All the funds interviewed operate in the same way: they specialize in 
certain types of entity or certain types of objective. B Fund, for example, wants 
to help entities founded by entrepreneurs from poor areas, so it sets itself tar-
gets for the number of entities helped, job development in those entities, rises 
in the number of young people trained by them, etc. The chosen indicators 
differ depending on the desired type of impact. Funds then organize reporting 
with their investees using those indicators in the same way as reporting on 
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financial indicators, and consolidate them at portfolio level for the purposes of 
reporting to capital providers.  
The indicators used are not converted into monetary value.37 The impact is 
monitored in the form of different sets of indicators, in what investors find a 
much more feasible approach. 
For a start, there are many existing tools that work on the basis of what you 
could call “financialization” of the social impact, to assign financial value to 
the social impact, and that’s not easy to do, it takes time and it’s pretty subjec-
tive. It isn’t easy to set a value on a social impact. […] There are some things 
that are really difficult to measure or quantify financially: you know, it’s a bit 
difficult when it comes to the wellbeing of a certain group, or stuff like that! 
So we decided it would be better to use a slightly more qualitative approach: 
we assess things, but without necessarily putting a price or value on them, just 
a quality assessment. (D Fund) 
This market segment’s practices seem to adopt a similar approach to the one 
that guided the inventors of the GIIN when they developed the IRIS measures 
(Barman 2015)38 and the JP Morgan proposal39 (2012). The question of the 
social impact is in both cases considered independently of the question of fi-
nancial return, by reference to non-financial criteria. 
Funds do not convert the social impact into monetary terms but want to be 
able to compare the social impact dimensions of their investments and judge 
them in relation to each other. The solidarity finance label identifies a group of 
investees that is not ranked on impact, but impact venture capitalists want a 
system where investees are assessed in relation to each other. This is also why 
they specialize in certain impacts, to compare and consolidate them. 
The idea is that all investments should be comparable. […] When we make an 
investment, the financial performance is always comparable to some other en-
tity’s financial performance. For social performance, that’s not always 
straightforward. So the fund’s investment policy has to be very clear, and tar-
geted enough for each entity’s social performance to be comparable. (B Fund) 
                                                             
37  As it would be with a SROI approach. 
38  As one of the interviewees in the study by Barman (2015, 30) observed: “what social impact 
looks like is investor specific. For example, one might want rural electricity in Africa while 
another might care about water sanitation for villagers in India. Other investors, like [name 
of an established impact investing fund] might think social impact arises when the very 
poor obtain employment.” 
39  In its study, the merchant bank develops a general methodology from a description of 
impact portfolio managers’ practices: any impact investor is first supposed “to articulate a 
set of well-defined impact goals for the portfolio,” with “reference to specific impact tar-
gets” “possibly quantifiable.” Once the target characteristics of the portfolio are defined, 
“investors may start to analyse the set of investments that fall within the scope of those 
portfolio targets.” JP Morgan proposes to characterise “every investment in three dimen-
sions: impact, return, and risk,” and to “abandon the trade-off debate“ (“whether or not 
there needs to be a ‘trade-off’ on financial returns in order to add the pursuit of impact to 
the investment”) (Morgan 2012, 5). 
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The funds then issue summary reports, often in the form of star diagrams.40 
These seem to be very widely used in the sector, because they make it possible 
to compare investees (Figure 3) and even portfolios while taking several criteria 
(the branches of the star) into consideration independently.  
Figure 3: Star Diagram of Impact Monitoring of a B Fund Investee 
 
B Fund (in Figure 3) has chosen to invest in firms established in disadvantaged 
areas, and monitoring of those firms is organized along five dimensions as 
shown in the diagram: Employment (jobs created in these areas), Apprentice-
ships (jobs for young people), Disability (jobs for the disabled), Helping people 
into work (jobs for certain groups of people seeking to enter the labor market, 
identified by the public employment services), Exemplarity (does the entrepre-
neur come from a disadvantaged area? Is his example receiving media atten-
tion? Is he involved in actions in the local area?).  
These diagrams can also be also used to monitor change, as in Figure 3 
which illustrates the entity’s development (between “when invested” and the 
“current situation”) and its “objectives.” A whole management by objectives 
system can then be developed all along the intermediation chain, with the inves-
tees and the impact funds having to meet social as well as financial objectives. 
The Recent Evolution towards More Measures and Professional 
Specialization 
Reporting which initially only had an accountability objective is in the process 
of changing nature, with the development of “social carried interest” systems. 
                                                             
40  JP Morgan also uses this star diagram form to monitor impact investment portfolio along 
the three criteria of return, risk and impact (Morgan, 2012). 
Exemplariness
Employment
ApprenticeshipsDisability
Helping people into work
Social Performance
Objectives Current situation when invested
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Carried interest is a share of the profits of the investment fund that is paid to 
the investment manager: it is a form of performance fee that rewards the man-
ager for enhancing performance. In order to receive carried interest, the manag-
er must first return all capital contributed by the investors, and, in certain cases, 
a previously agreed-upon rate of return (the “hurdle rate”) to investors. If the 
fund outperforms the hurdle rate, its managers take home a substantial share 
(often 20%) of the surplus profit. This is common practice in the private equity 
world but is now being adapted to impact funds at the request of institutional 
investors and funds of funds, which frequently deal with other venture capital-
ists. The European Investment Fund (EIF) thus requires the funds in which the 
SIA invests to set social objectives, which if achieved will trigger part of the 
performance fees. The aim is to prevent fund managers from receiving “carried 
interest” if they have not achieved the social objectives for which the funding 
was given to them.41 
This trend is more generally being driven by the rise of impact “funds of 
funds,” like A Fund interviewed for this study. And funds like B and C Funds 
follow this practice when they want to be selected by the big new funds of funds. 
In our fund we’ve tried to develop alignment of interests […]. Because the 
reason our investors invest with us isn’t for financial performance. They know 
they’ll get a lower financial return than they could have had if they invested in 
a LBO fund. But that’s not what they’re after: they want a good financial and 
social performance. So what do we tell them? We promise lower financial  
return (we’re at 8% for instance instead of 10%), but as a team our financial 
rewards will kick in sooner (from 2% for instance instead of 4% or 5%). But 
this “carried interest” will be conditional on achieving the social performance 
objective. That’s something we developed with our investors for fund 3. The 
idea is that for each investment, just like we do financial forecasting, we 
promise to create a certain number of jobs, for example. We’ll be evaluated at 
the end, between the actual results and the promised results, so if we don’t 
manage at least 50% or 60% of our objectives, we don’t get any carried inter-
est, even if the financial performance is outstanding. (B Fund) 
Impact funds of funds are a recent development. They constitute pockets of 
money that are big enough to be entrusted to managers specializing in impact 
investing. Their rise can be seen as a sign that the idea of developing a special-
ized impact investment market with its own professionals is gaining ground. 
                                                             
41  “Fund managers shall disclose social impact indicators and pre-investment target value to 
their investors and calculate on a regular basis (at least once a year) the impact multiple, 
defined as the comparison between pre-investment target and realised value. Impact multi-
ples shall be reported at least once a year. The financial performance incentive of the fund 
manager (carried interest) will be subject to the social impact performance of the fund” 
(Social Impact Accelerator (SIA) - terms of reference, EIF website <http://www.eif.org/ 
what_we_do/equity/sia/terms-of-reference.htm> [Accessed March 20, 2017]). 
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Effect on the Investees 
In contrast to the label in the previous section, the judgment devices used by 
these actors are associated with a policy of close monitoring of investees, and 
thus have significant influence on what the investees can do. As a result the 
relations between the fund and the investee are very different. Also, the finan-
cial return demanded is much higher, and this criterion automatically excludes 
many social impact organizations. The ideal investees are standard unlisted 
firms: they have no restrictions on profit distribution, can be sold, and while the 
search for a social impact is not a decisive factor in strategy development, they 
create social impact simply by their expansion. This is the kind of target firms 
that are sought by B Fund for example: normal firms, but based in poor dis-
tricts or created by an entrepreneur who comes from a poor district. Some 
funds want to stay in this small niche known as “impact too,” where they are 
competing with other investment funds that are only pursuing financial returns. 
The survey by the Comité Français (2014) reports that most venture-capital 
impact funds can also invest in firms with a more clearly asserted social impact 
(with “a social mission enshrined in their articles of association” or where 
“profits are partly reserved”). However, it is clear that very few actors are 
willing to invest in cooperatives or associations, whose status is hostile to the 
financial approach on two levels: it is difficult if not impossible to sell such an 
organization, and, according to the French law, to distribute its profits over a 
regulated rate.42 If II were reduced to the practices described in this section, it 
would clearly be unable to fund all social organizations. The solidarity finance 
segment is thus necessary to channel money towards less profitable targets.  
Yet Sir Ronald Cohen, the most passionate promoter of II in Europe,43 be-
lieves that II in its venture capital form (the only form he addresses under this 
name) can be the solution to the social question, as he asserts in a well-oiled 
narrative that stresses the limitations of philanthropy and public action:44 ac-
cording to him, II can provide ways to “harness the most powerful forces of 
capitalism: entrepreneurship, innovation and capital to tackle social issues more 
effectively” and “connect [social sector organizations] to the capital markets” 
                                                             
42  Only impact funds originating in the solidarity economy develop funding solutions for these 
entities: this is the case for SIFA as mentioned above – the only fund to finance associa-
tions, D Fund in our sample, which is a subsidiary of a social organization, and the small co-
operative impact fund (specializing in cooperatives) launched in 2015 by the venture capital 
subsidiary of Crédit Coopératif (the bank for cooperatives). 
43  See above part 2 and note 13. 
44  “Over the past couple of centuries, philanthropists have tried their very best to improve the 
lives of those left behind. […] But by the mid-1930s, governments had begun to realize that 
philanthropy alone could not cope. […] Today, welfare states designed for the 20th century 
are throwing up their arms in face of the struggle against the new century’s social chal-
lenges. They realize that they are not best placed to innovate in bringing solutions to social 
issues” (Cohen 2014, 2). 
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(Cohen 2014, 3). To get around social organizations’ inability to generate re-
turns, a third segment is needed in the II market, with different judgment de-
vices that encourage the convertibility of social impact into money.  
4.4  The New Frontier of Impact Investing: Monetizing Social 
Impact 
What Is It? 
If the social impact can be given a monetary value, then that value can be used 
as a price in exchanges. And certain actors (principally the public authorities or 
philanthropic organizations) could be interested in purchasing “social impacts” 
and delegating their production to privately-funded for-profit organizations. 
The capitalists investing in these organizations would not be giving up any of 
their financial return objective, but would receive their return on investment by 
combining the low financial return from the organization with resale of the 
social return. This system already exists: Social Impact Bonds were invented in 
the UK to draw financial returns from unprofitable organizations. These vehi-
cles enable all kinds of social activities to be financed by capitalism, in line 
with Sir Ronald Cohen’s dream: 
We already see notable changes in the way impact investments are thought 
through and presented. Investment proposals are framed in new ways that as-
sess expected social as well as financial returns. Take an investment commit-
tee considering a £10m SIB that pays out 2%-13% per annum according to so-
cial outcomes achieved. Say the most likely net return is 7% p.a. while the risk 
requires 11% p.a. Previously the committee might have turned it down. To-
day, the social value created would be quantified. The missing 4% p.a. over 
the 7 year life of the SIB translates into £4.7m. If the SIB aims to get 4700 re-
leased prisoners, over and above the average number in the past, into jobs and 
useful lives, this would represent £1000 per offender helped. If philanthropic 
foundations experienced in helping reoffenders would have been pleased to 
donate £1000 to rehabilitate a prisoner, then the social return would be 4%. If 
they would have been pleased with £3000 per prisoner, then the social return 
would be three times as great, 12%. An investment generating a 7% financial 
return and a 12% social return would be very attractive. (Cohen 2014, 6) 
So far SIBs only exist in a very small number of countries. Only the UK is 
developing a systematic policy on the issue (Golka 2016; Cooper et al. 2016; 
Dowling 2016). There is no market for SIBs in France yet but the government 
has just decided to launch its first experiments in 2016. This is one of the nota-
ble results of the work done by the Comité Français (2014), since one of the 
ten recommendations in its report was to experiment with SIBs. The statement 
by Sir Ronald Cohen quoted above comes directly from one of his speeches, 
which was translated and attached to the French report. On June 10, 2016, 
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Impact Invest Lab was launched in France by six founder members who were 
already part of the Comité Français.45 Following on from the G8 report they 
declared their “ambition of contributing to the debate, experimenting and ac-
celerating the development of social impact investing.” The lab’s first project is 
to develop SIBs, and funds are being generated to finance the feasibility studies 
needed to conduct the first contracts. 
The Judgment Device They Use and Who Is Interested 
Among our interviewees, the audit firm, doubtless the most interested in this 
practice, has decided to contribute to the new II Lab. SIB contracts are very 
similar to public-private partnership agreements, and require two resources the 
audit firm can offer: legal advice for financial arrangements, and valuation 
services. In addition, given the economic stakes involved in impact measure-
ment, audit and certification services are necessary. Other French actors that 
are spreading valuation methods, such as Social Return On Investment de-
signed to assign financial value to impacts, may be interested by the develop-
ment of SIB in France. The “avoided cost” method is another standard way of 
attempting to estimate the value of impacts: this consists of assessing the costs 
that would have to be borne in the absence of the positive impacts produced by 
the entity. This method takes it for granted that a social expense will be made, 
generally made by the state, and therefore assumes the existence of an effective 
welfare state, which is paradoxical to say the least when the aim is to make up 
for the welfare state’s shortcomings. 
Effect on the Investees 
The type of relationship that becomes established along the investment chain 
between investors and investees takes another new turn in this case. In the 
previous case, only the fund manager stood to benefit personally from 
achievement of social objectives through the carried interest system, while the 
investor only received the financial return the fund was able to offer, in many 
cases a lower return than on a purely financial investment. With SIBs, the 
investor himself takes a direct share in the social return: only if the entity 
achieves its social objectives will the public authorities or the philanthropic 
foundation that signed the contract pay out the financial return. Monitoring the 
entity that produces impacts will then be essentially based on social indicators.  
                                                             
45  CDC, MOUVES, Crédit Coopératif, Finansol, le Centre Français des Fonds et des Fondations 
(federation of French foundations), le Comptoir de l’Innovation (an impact fund). 
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5.  Conclusion – Discussion 
The efforts made to construct a unified impact investing market are having to 
deal with longstanding social finance practices that have led to the establish-
ment of a number of institutions, such that these efforts are displacing and 
redefining the accepted categories. We have monitored the operations that 
accompany market building. Creating a new class of assets requires boundary 
work intended to make the subject explicit, and as we have seen this work 
involves both boundary-building and boundary-blurring. In particular, II is 
busy breaking down the boundaries between gifts and interest, between the 
search for financial returns and social aims. 
But market building cannot rely on this essentially discursive boundary 
work alone. It also needs devices to assess the qualities of the goods ex-
changed, which in practice will make it possible to classify social structures 
based on their desirability for the investor. These new assessment practices 
complement and compete with existing devices. In the French setting, the ex-
istence of an active, organized solidarity finance environment is preventing 
direct penetration by the new II practices. Instead, more boundary work is 
necessary in order to enroll the existing actors, but this comes at the cost of 
accepting the existence of different segments associated with different judg-
ment practices.  
However, a general shift can be noticed towards stricter requirements for 
visible social results from the entities financed and the development of some 
professional specialization. Construction of a new market class thus goes hand 
in hand with polarization into subclasses associated with different judgment 
systems for investees.  
These different judgment devices are inseparable from very different rela-
tional configurations or “regimes for coordination” between the actors con-
cerned. From the investee’s perspective, the game rules vary widely, as sum-
marized in Table 2. The constraints differ depending on the funding channel 
considered. In a context where several actors are pushing for development of 
venture capital-type forms of finance, organizations in the greatest need of 
public funding may rightly be anxious, especially if the funding that reaches 
them through past channels could dry up because it is directed into other chan-
nels. This risk has not yet materialized, but is part of the rhetoric of supporters 
of impact investing, such as Sir Ronald Cohen who sees Social Impact Bonds 
as the way to bring the private sector to finance non-profitable activities of a 
social nature, through redirection of public funds and philanthropic finance into 
for-profit entities that are put in charge of social activities. 
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Table 2: Segments of Impact Investing, Judgment Methods and Coordination 
Regimes in France  
“Market” segments Solidarity Finance 
(already in existence, 
the largest segment) 
Social Venture capital 
(already in existence, 
smaller but growing 
fast ) 
Social Impact bonds 
(very experimental, not 
yet in existence in 
France) 
Judgment devices and their characteristics 
Impact judgment 
devices 
The ESUS label, awarded 
by the state. 
Non-financial impact 
indicators, depending 
on the type of objective 
pursued. 
Monetary measure of 
social impact. 
 
Effect on investees - Determines their 
access to low-cost 
financing. 
- Strict rules to respect 
in order to gain the 
label. 
- Not applicable to 
purely commercial for-
profit organizations. 
- Dual ranking of 
organizations.  
- Not applicable to low-
return or not-for-profit 
organizations.  
A device mainly 
designed for unprofita-
ble organizations so 
that it can become 
eligible for venture 
capital financing. 
Quantification of the 
impact 
Small and recent. 
Simple indicators. 
Small and based on 
simple indicators. 
Recently toughened 
with the introduction of 
“social carried interest” 
Detailed, costly quanti-
fication (complex 
methods) by a third 
party who acts as 
guarantor (audit). 
Investee-investor relations 
Type of financial return Small (less than 2%).  - Ideally comparable to 
the average financial 
return on venture 
capital. 
- Possibility of a lower 
return (depending on 
fund policies). 
Ideally comparable to 
the average financial 
return on venture 
capital thanks to the 
addition of financial 
returns and monetized 
social returns. 
Who gives the financial 
return? 
Investee. Investee. - Investee and 
- Public authorities or 
philanthropic organiza-
tions. 
Criterion structuring 
investor-investee 
relations  
Solely financial, 
essentially related to 
the risk of not recover-
ing the capital. 
Financial and social:  
Financial and social 
objectives to be 
achieved are assessed 
separately. 
Principally social 
because social return is 
central to the future 
financial return. 
How does the investor 
monitor the social 
impact? 
Once a year for external 
communication 
purposes. 
 
Regular reporting for 
monitoring purposes. 
Regular reporting for 
monitoring purposes, 
audited by an inde-
pendent party. 
Investor’s involvement 
in the social model 
Low. Average. The economic 
question remains the 
primary concern. 
Extensive. 
Other investee relations 
Effect on relations with 
their other financers 
(public authorities, 
donors) 
None. None. Very significant. Public 
or philanthropic 
funding goes to the 
private financer. 
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The case studied here draws our attention to another characteristic of finance 
market classification systems. They were initially created to classify organiza-
tions to be funded, but are in fact used to structure the entire intermediation 
chain. Like the classifications by Bowker and Star (2000), they facilitate coor-
dination between different worlds and operate as boundary objects that shape 
actions obeying rationales that vary with the actors who take them up (social 
organizations, impact funds, funds of funds, state, foundations, etc.). In general, 
the longer the financing circuits become, the more the device has to be adapted 
to facilitate remote management. In the first segment, the form of the label, 
which creates a binary classification between beneficiary organizations and the 
rest, is particularly effective in this respect. It does not cost much, because 
approval is granted for a 5-year period, and it facilitates both establishment of 
public policies attached to the category and lower-cost financial intermediation. 
On the venture capital segment, financing circuits are also growing longer with 
the arrival of funds of funds and this is driving standardization of social impact 
monitoring. This way, indicators can be consolidated simply in the various 
intermediation vehicles, and compared between vehicles.  
What is also striking is that whatever the circuit or the market segment, the 
involvement of public policies is bringing the state to intervene in the creation 
and standardization of market judgment devices. The ESUS label is fully regu-
lated. In the venture capital segment, additional investment by public funds in 
vehicles whose managers stand to gain a disproportionate share of the returns is 
bringing public bodies to toughen up social impact measures in order to control 
the distributions that could take place at that level. 
This case study is an illustration of the dual role of judgment devices, to or-
ganize market classes and to classify their participants and products, and of 
their consequences for the objects being judged. It suggests that the special 
form these devices take deserves close attention. We have seen that a label is 
not the same thing as a continuous indicator, a score or a ranking for those 
evaluated. Most notably, we illustrated that the form of the indicator itself 
cannot be separated from the relational configuration that gave rise to it and 
gives it its relative coercive force. 
References 
Akerlof, George. 1970. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488-500. 
Alix, Nicole, and Adrien Baudet. 2013. La mesure de l’impact social : facteur de 
transformation du secteur social en Europe. 4e Conférence internationale du  
CIRIEC, <http://recma.org/node/3786> (Accessed March 20, 2017).  
Barman, Emily. 2015. Of Principle and Principal: Value Plurality in the Market of 
Impact Investing. Valuation Studies 3 (1): 9-44. 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  184 
Beckert, Jens, and Christine Musselin, eds. 2013. Constructing Quality. The Classi-
fication of Goods in Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Beckert, Jens, and Jörg Rössel. 2013. The Price of Art. European societies 15 (22): 
178-195. 
Bessy, Christian, and Pierre-Marie Chauvin. 2013. The Power of Market Intermedi-
aries: From Information to Valuation Processes. Valuation Studies 1 (1): 83-117. 
Boltanski, Luc and Laurent Thévenot. 2006. On Justification: Economies of Worth. 
Princeton and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press. 
Bourgeron, Theo. 2016. Quand les financiers investissent le social. La construction 
d’un business model de l’intermédiation financière du social. Research Presenta-
tion. Chiapello EHESS Research seminar. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction. A social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (translation of La distinction. Critique 
sociale du jugement. Paris: éd. de Minuit. first published in 1979). 
Bowker, Geoffrey C., and Susan L. Star. 2000. Sorting Things Out. Classification 
and Its Consequences. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Callon, Michel, Cecile Meadel, and Vololona Rabeharisoa. 2002. The Economy of 
Qualities. Economy and Society 31 (2): 194-217. 
Callon, Michel, and Fabian Muniesa. 2005. Economic Markets as Calculative Col-
lective Devices. Organization Studies 26 (8): 1229-50.  
Callon, Michel, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa, eds. 2007. Market Devices. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Chateau-Terrisse, Pascale. 2013. Les outils de gestion, transporteurs et régulateurs 
des logiques institutionnelles. Cas de deux organisations de capital-risque soli-
daire. PhD diss., Université Paris-Est. 
Chiapello, Eve. 2015. Financialisation of Valuation. Human Studies 38 (1): 13-35. 
Chiapello, Eve, and Walter Christian. 2016. The Three Ages of Financial Quantifica-
tion: A Conventionalist Approach to the Financiers’ Metrology. Historical Social 
Research 41 (2): 155-77. doi: 10.12759/hsr.41.2016.2.155-177. 
Cooper, Christine, Cameron Graham, and Darlene Himick. 2016. Social Impact 
Bonds. The Securitization of the Homeless. Working paper. 
Cronon, William. 1991. Nature’s Metropolis. Chicago and the Great West. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Cohen, Ronald. 2014. Revolutionising Philanthropy: Impact Investment. 
<http://www.ronaldcohen.org/sites/default/files/26/MANSION HOUSE SPEECH 
23JAN14 [FINAL].pdf> (Accessed March 20, 2017). 
Comité Français. 2014. (President Hugues Sibille, Rapporteur Cyrille Langendorff, 
Representatives of the state Claude Leroy Themeze (MEF) and Nadia Voisin 
(MAEDI)). 2014. Comment et pourquoi favoriser des investissements à impact 
social? Innover financièrement pour innover socialement. Report of Comité fran-
çais sur l’investissement à impact social. 
Desrosières, Alain. 2001. Réalisme métrologique et conventions d’équivalence. Les 
ambiguïtés de la sociologie quantitative. Genèses 43: 112-27 
Dowling, Emma. 2016. In the Wake of Austerity: Social Impact Bonds and the 
Financialisation of the Welfare State in Britain. New Political Economy, pub-
lished online September 26, 1-17, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/ 
10.1080/13563467.2017.1232709> (Accessed March 20, 2017). 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  185 
Durkheim, Émile, and Marcel Mauss. 1969 [1903]. Primitive Classification. Lon-
don: Cohen & West, Routledge Revivals. Translation of „De quelques formes 
primitives de classification. Contribution à l’étude des représentations collec-
tives“. Année Sociologique 1901-2. 
Espeland, Wendy N., and Michael Sauder. 2007. Rankings and Reactivity: How 
Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds. American Journal of Sociology 113 (1): 
1-40. 
Espeland, Wendy N., and Mitchell L. Stevens. 1998. Commensuration as a Social 
Process. Annual Review of Sociology 24: 313-43. 
Eymard-Duvernay, François. 1989. Conventions de qualité et formes de coordina-
tion. Revue Economique 40 (2): 329-59  
Eymard-Duvernay, François, and Emmanuelle Marchal. 1997. Façons de recruter. 
Le jugement des compétences sur le marché du travail. Paris: Métailié.  
Eymard-Duvernay, François, ed. 2006a. L’économie des conventions, méthodes et 
résultats. Tome 1 : Débats. Paris: La découverte.  
Eymard-Duvernay, François, ed. 2006b. L’économie des conventions, méthodes et 
résultats. Tome 2 : Développements. Paris: La découverte. 
Eurosif. 2014. European SRI Study. Report published online <http://www. 
eurosif.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Eurosif-SRI-Study-20142.pdf> (Acces-
sed March 20, 2017). 
Fligstein, Neil, and Luke Dauter. 2007. The Sociology of Markets. The Annual 
Review of Sociology 33: 6.1-6.24. 
Finansol. 2016. Zoom sur la finance solidaire 2016. <https://www.finansol.org/ 
_dwl/zoom-finance-solidaire.pdf>, (Accessed March 20, 2017). 
Fourcade, Marion, and Kieran Healy. 2013. Classification Situations: Life-Chances 
in the Neoliberal Era. Accounting Organizations and Society 38 (8): 559-72. 
Fourcade, Marion and Kieran Healy. 2017. Classification Situations: Life-Chances 
in the Neoliberal Era. Historical Social Research 42 (1): 23-51. [Reprint of Four-
cade and Healy 2013]. 
GECES. 2014. Proposed Approaches to Social Impact Measurement in European 
Commission legislation and in practice relating to EuSEFs and the EaSI.  
European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/social_business/ 
docs/expert-group/social_impact/140605-sub-group-report_en.pdf> (Accessed 
March 20, 2017). 
GIIN, and J.P. Morgan. 2014. Spotlight on the Market. The Impact Investor Survey. 
Global Social Finance May 2. JP Morgan <https://www.jpmorganchase.com/ 
corporate/socialfinance/document/140502_Spotlight_on_the_Market.pdf> (Ac-
cessed March 20, 2017). 
Geiger, Susi, Debbie Harrison, Hans Kjellberg, and Alexandre Mallard, eds. 2014. 
Concerned Markets: Economic Ordering for Multiple Values. London: Edward 
Elgar. 
Golka, Philipp. 2016. How private profits became “public benefit” – A case study 
of Impact Investing and the financialization of welfare in the U.K. Society for the 
Advancement of Socio-Economics Conference, June 24-26, Berkeley, California. 
Guézennec, Camille, and Guillaume Malochet. 2013. L’impact investing pour 
financer l’économie sociale et solidaire? Une comparaison internationale. 
Commissariat Général à la prospective et au plan. Report. 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  186 
Hacking, Ian. 1999. The social construction of what? Cambridge, MA, and London: 
Harvard University Press. 
Höchstädter, Anna K., and Barbara Scheck. 2015. What’s in a Name: An Analysis 
of Impact Investing Understandings by Academics and Practitioners. Journal of 
Business Ethics 132: 449-75. 
IRIS. 2014. Iris data brief, focus on beneficiaries, March (2). IRIS Research 
<https://thegiin.org/assets/binary-data/IRISData_Brief_Beneficiaries_2014.pdf> 
(Accessed March 20, 2017). 
JP Morgan. 2010. Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class. Global Research 
November 29. <https://assets.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/20101129 
131310/Impact-Investments-An-Emerging-Asset-Class.pdf> (Accessed March 
22, 2017).  
JP Morgan. 2012. A Portfolio Approach to Impact Investment, A Practical Guide to 
Building, Analyzing and Managing a Portfolio of Impact Investments. Global So-
cial Finance October 1. JP Morgan <https://www.jpmorganchase.com/ 
corporate/socialfinance/document/121001_A_Portfolio_Approach_to_Impact_ 
Investment.pdf> (Accessed March 22, 2017). 
JP Morgan. 2015. Impact Assessment in Practice, Experience from Leading Impact 
Investors. Global Social Finance May 4.JP Morgan <https:// 
www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320674289368.pdf> (Accessed March 22, 2017). 
Karpik, Lucien. 2010. Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press. 
Lazarus, Jeanne. 2012. L’épreuve de l’argent. Banques, banquiers, clients. Paris: 
Calmann-Lévy. 
MacKenzie, Donald. 2009. Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the 
Politics of Carbon Markets. Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (3): 440-55. 
Monitor Institute. 2009. Investing for Social and Environmental Impact. New York: 
Monitor Institute <http://monitorinstitute.com/downloads/what-we-think/impact-
investing/Impact_Investing.pdf> (Accessed March 22, 2017). 
Rivaud-Danset, Dorothée, and Robert Salais. 1992. Les conventions de financement 
des entreprises. Premières approches théorique et empirique. Revue française 
d’économie 7 (4): 81-120. 
Rockefeller. 2012a. Accelerating Impact. Achievements, Challenges and What’s 
Next in Building the Impact Investing Industry. The Rockefeller Foundation 
<https://assets.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/uploads/20150904105728/Impact-
Investing-Scan-Report-2012.pdf> (Accessed March 20, 2017). 
Rockefeller. 2012b. Unlocking Capital, Activating a Movement, Final Report of the 
Strategic Assessment of The Rockefeller Foundation’s Impact Investing Initiative. 
The Rockefeller Foundation <https://assets.rockefellerfoundation.org/app/ 
uploads/20120301193129/Impact-Investing-Evaluation-Report-2012.pdf> (Ac-
cessed March 20, 2017). 
Rössel, Jörg, and Jens Beckert. 2013. Quality Classifications in Competition; Price 
Formation in the German Wine Market. In Constructing Quality. The Classifica-
tion of Goods in Markets, ed. Jens Beckert and Christine Musselin, 288-315. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
Salais, Robert, and Michael Storper. 1997. Worlds of Production. The Action 
Frameworks of the Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  187 
Sibille, Hugues. 2011. La voie de l’innovation sociale. Paris: éditions Rue de 
l’échiquier. 
SIITF (Social Impact Investment Taskforce). 2014a. Impact Investment: the invisi-
ble heart of markets. Harnessing the power of entrepreneurship, innovation and 
capital for public good. Report established under the UK’s presidency of the G8 
<http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org/reports/Impact Investment Report FI-
NAL[3].pdf> (Accessed March 20, 2017).  
SIITF (Social Impact Investment Taskforce). 2014b. Measuring Impact. Subject 
paper of the Impact Measurement Working Group. Report established under the 
UK’s presidency of the G8 <http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org/reports/ 
Measuring Impact WG paper FINAL.pdf> (Accessed March 20, 2017). 
Starr, Paul. 1992. Social Categories and Claims in the Liberal State. Social 
Research 59 (2): 263-95. 
Steiner, Philippe. 2010. Marché, transaction marchande et non marchande. In 
L’activité marchande sans le marché, ed. Armand Hatchuel, Olivier Favereau 
and Franck Aggeri, 147-57. Paris: Presse des Mines. 
Swedberg, Richard. 1994. Markets as Social Structures. In The Handbook of Eco-
nomic Sociology, ed. Neil. J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, 255-82. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Appendix 
Interviewees 
Organizations Interviewees Duration 
French Impact Funds 
A: Fund of funds 
(insurance)  
3 impact fund managers 
+ 5 support team members (shared 
with SRI funds) 
5 recorded interviews  
(between 50’ and 1:30) 
3 not recorded  
B: Venture Capital Fund  2 fund managers  50’ and 1:10 recorded 
C: Venture Capital Fund  1 project manager  1:15, recorded 
D: Venture Capital Fund and 
Consulting firm (created by a 
social enterprise) 
1 project manager  40’ recorded 
E: Collective Investment Fund 
(bank ) 
1 fund manager  50’ recorded 
F: Collective Investment Fund 
(bank) 
1 fund manager  1:40 recorded 
G: Regional Cooperative 
Impact Fund 
1 project manager  45’ not recorded 
Others 
Finansol association 1 project manager 45’ not recorded 
Impact Crowdfunding platform 2 founders and 1 employee  20’ to 30’ not recorded 
Big Audit firm The person in charge of solidarity-
based economy 
1:30, not recorded 
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Abbreviation Index 
ADIE: France’s micro-credit institution, operating into the country 
AFD: Agence Française de Développement (France’s development bank) 
AVISE: Agence de Valorisation des Initiatives Socio-Economiques, promoting 
social entrepreneurship  
BPI: Banque Publique d’Investissement (France’s public investment bank) 
CDC: Caisse des Dépots et des Consignations (a French public bank) 
CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility 
EFAMA: European Fund and Asset Management Association 
EIF: European Investment Fund 
ESG: Environmental, Social and Governance criteria  
ESSEC: a French Business School 
ESUS: Entreprises Solidaires d’Utilité Sociale (solidarity firms of social utili-
ty), a public label 
EU: European Union 
Eurosif: European association for the promotion and advancement of sustaina-
ble and responsible investment across Europe  
EVPA: European venture Philanthropy Association 
Finansol: French association for the promotion of solidarity finance  
GECES: the Expert Group on Social Entrepreneurship  
GIIN: Global Impact Investing Network (www.thegiin.org) 
GIIRS: Global Impact Investing Rating System 
II: impact investing 
IRIS: Impact Reporting and Investment Standard 
MOUVES: Mouvement des Entrepreneurs Sociaux (social entrepreneurs’ 
movement) 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
SIA: Social Impact Accelerator (a fund of funds dedicated to impact investing, 
managed EIF) 
SIFA: institution specialized in funding for entities supporting social integra-
tion, subsidiary of CDC 
SIB: Social Impact Bonds 
SIFT: Social investment task force, funded at the request of HM Treasury, 
chaired by Sir R. Cohen 
SIITF: Social Impact Investment Taskforce, established by the G8, chaired by 
Sir R. Cohen 
SRI: Socially Responsible Investment  
SROI: Social Return on Investment 
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